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ANDY HAMILTON
The Aesthetics of Imperfection Reconceived:
Improvisations, Compositions, and Mistakes
abstract
Ted Gioia associated the “aesthetics of imperfection” with improvised music. In an earlier article, I extended it to all musical
performance. This article reconceives my discussion, offering more precise analyses: (1) The aesthetics of imperfection is
now argued to involve open, spontaneous response to contingencies of performance or production, reacting positively to
idiosyncratic instruments; apparent failings in performance, and so on. Perfectionists, in contrast, prefer a planning model,
not readily modified in face of contingencies. (2) Imperfection is not toleration of errors and imperfections, as Gioia assumes,
but a positive aesthetic, as in Japanese wabi-sabi. Imperfections can become new styles or kinds of perfection—and so true
imperfectionism is a constant striving for new contingencies to respond to. (3) A subtler, more complex relation between
composition and improvisation is proposed, in which both have broad and narrow senses. Composition involves (a) works,
usually desk produced and notated; or more generally, (b) putting things together in an aesthetically rewarding form. Thus,
improvisation is a (broad sense) compositional method. (4) Improvisation and composition are interdependent; both involve
structure and spontaneity. (5) Imperfectionism is an aesthetics of performance—of compositions as well as improvisations.
Improvisation is no risker, or prone to mistakes, than performance of compositions.
i. the aesthetics of imperfection as
spontaneous response to contingencies
In a precursor article, I argued that the opposi-
tion between the aesthetics of perfection and im-
perfection offers a fruitful framework for looking
at certain aesthetic questions in the performing
arts (Hamilton 2000). That opposition was illus-
trated by the debate between Ferruccio Busoni,
the defender of spontaneity, and Arnold Schoen-
berg, the compositional determinist.1 Schoenberg
emphasized the autonomyof the composer-genius
in the creation of masterworks, which, he insisted,
required the complete subservience of the per-
former. Busoni, in contrast, found virtues in im-
provisation and in the individual contribution of
the performer-interpreter:
Notation . . . is primarily an ingenious expedient for
catching an inspiration . . . notation is to improvisa-
tion as the portrait is to the living model. . . . What the
composer’s inspiration necessarily loses through nota-
tion, his interpreter should restore by his own. ([1907]
1962, 84)
Busoni defended his practice of transcription—
the arrangement of a composition for a medium
different from the one for which it was originally
composed—arguing that “Every notation is . . .
the transcription of an abstract idea. The instant
the pen seizes it, the idea loses its original form.”
The purity of the improvisation is one step less
removed from the locus of artistic inspiration.
For Schoenberg, in contrast, there is only gain
inworking up an improvisation into a crafted com-
position. He rejected Busoni’s claim that improvi-
sation has artistic priority: “the portrait has higher
artistic life” (quoted in Stuckenschmidt 1977, 226).
The interpreter is the work’s servant: “He must
read every wish from its lips” (227). The inter-
preter must not express his own individuality; he
becomes “a parasite on the exterior, when he
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could be the artery in the circulation of the blood”
(227). Busoni’s imperfectionism is humanistic, fo-
cusing on the moment or event of performance,
while Schoenberg’s perfectionism emphasizes the
timeless work—thoroughgoing perfectionism as-
sumes a Platonic conception of abstract sound
structures. An aesthetics of perfection is also im-
plied by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Platonic account
of music and score in the Tractatus. (1922, 4.014)
Neither Busoni nor Schoenberg referred to the
“aesthetics of imperfection”—a term apparently
coined by jazz historian Ted Gioia, who assumes
“imperfection” in its ordinary negative sense. On
his view, to be spontaneous, improvisers take risks
that cause imperfections. Improvisation has in-
evitable flaws, but compensating advantages:
Errors will creep in . . . in form [and] execution; the im-
proviser [pushes] himself into areas of expression which
his technique may be unable to handle . . . the finished
product will show moments of rare beauty intermixed
with technical mistakes and aimless passages.
My earlier article regarded imperfection more
positively than Gioia, recognizing the interdepen-
dence of improvisation and composition; it also
suggested that “imperfect” implies “unfinished.”
That final suggestion now seemswrong.2 I now de-
velop apositive sense of imperfection, reconceiving
the aesthetics of imperfection as an open, sponta-
neous response to contingencies of performance or
production, that aims to create something positive
from apparently unpromising as well as promising
circumstances. Perfectionists, in contrast, favor a
planningmodel, not readilymodified in the face of
contingencies—which they regard as at best some-
thing to be tolerated.
I now argue, against Gioia, that “imperfection”
is not a means to an end, but contributes to the
value of the whole. Thus, the Japanese aesthetic
ofwabi-sabi involves object-specific appreciation,
acceptance, ageing—a mark on a bowl enhances
its value. My “reconception” also involves new
thinking on mistakes—understanding imperfec-
tionism’s view of mistakes, helps us understand
imperfection’s positive value. Since imperfections
can become new styles or kinds of perfection, true
imperfectionism is a constant striving for new con-
tingencies to respond to.
This article draws on Wittgenstein’s later dis-
cussion of language games in its analysis of aes-
thetic concepts. It also follows Eric Lewis’s “prac-
tical guiding principle” that “the thoughts ofmusi-
cians concerning their own creative activities must
be taken very seriously” (2019, 10).3 I particularly
attend to what musicians say about the contingen-
cies that they work with: instruments and acous-
tics of varying excellence or idiosyncrasy; appar-
ent failings, errors, or mistakes in one’s own per-
formance or that of colleagues; or more gener-
ally, age and infirmity. Different art forms have
contrasting parameters; in ceramics, for instance,
there are unintended or unpredicted results in fir-
ing or glazing process. Tony Buck of improvisers
The Necks comments:
Quirks in instruments or technologies [can] produce sur-
prising or unpredictable results . . . broken-down drum-
kits have idiosyncrasies that are great to exploit . . . If [the
room] has weird quirks, andwe’re obliged to do a certain
[composition], and it’s not going to work, we still have
to do it. But [improvisers] can . . . respond to site-specific
circumstances. (quoted in Hamilton, forthcoming 2020)
Jazz vibraharpist Gary Burton, who retired re-
cently following heart surgery, explained, “My
playing reached a peak a few years ago and
was now moving downward.” Improvisers such as
Lester Young, Lee Konitz, Sheila Jordan, and Su-
sana Baca, in contrast, respond creatively to age
and infirmity.
There are perfectionists and imperfectionists
in all areas of music making and art, and their
artistic attitudes lie on a continuum. The per-
fection/imperfection opposition involves multidi-
mensional continua. One can be a perfectionist
in some respects, but not in others; Keith Jar-
rett is an imperfectionist concerning spontaneous
improvisation, but a perfectionist concerning the
instrument. Dave Brubeck criticizes perfection-
ist improvisers—jazz musicians who rely on the
safety net of learned patterns and “[strive] for
perfection,”whose playing “will lack vital involve-
ment with the moment of creation.” It should be
stressed that spontaneity is at the level of partic-
ular performance—that is, improvisers can prac-
tice for the spontaneous effort. It must also be
stressed that individual performers lie on a contin-
uum between perfection and imperfection. These
attitudes of perfection and imperfection are nei-
ther correct nor incorrect but reflect contrasting
artistic values.
Many commentators assume that the perfec-
tion versus imperfection debate concerns the
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merits of improvisation versus composition—
notably Gioia (1988). However, as my earlier
article argued (2000), his concept of imperfection,
associated with jazz and improvised music, should
be extended to all kinds of musical performance.
The aesthetics of imperfection embraces im-
provisation and composition; it is an aesthetics
of performance. Comparing improvisation with
performance of compositions, rather than with
composition as such, reveals the reciprocity of
composition and improvisation—imperfection, in
some positive sense, is seen as an intrinsic good.
I return to aesthetic imperfectionism directly in
the final section; first, I address alleged contrasts
between improvisation and composition, in light
of the aesthetics of imperfection.
ii. broad and narrow senses of composition
and improvisation, and the work concept
The development of improvisation is intimately
connected with that of the composer–performer
divide—but the nature of improvisation and com-
position is not obvious. I now argue that both have
broad and narrow senses. Narrow sense composi-
tion is the production of works, usually notated;
broad sense composition means putting things to-
gether in an aesthetically rewarding form.4 Thus,
improvisation can be a method of (broad sense)
composition; there is no music that is not com-
posed, in a broad sense. My suggestion is that the
distinction between broad and narrow senses is
implicit in the language game involving music and
the performing arts.
II.A. The Modernist Story of a
Composer–Performer Divide
Notation probably began as amnemonic device, to
remind performers of music already fixed. West-
ern medieval notation did not specify pitch—not
because it was left open, as in some of John Cage’s
scores, but because performers did not need re-
minding. But notation transcended its mnemonic
origins, becoming a driving force in music’s evo-
lution. Hence the familiar modernist story of a
composer–performer divide in Western music—a
story that I qualify without rejecting it. This divide
developed with the advent of staff notation from
the twelfth to thirteenth centuries. The composer
became a desk worker rather than performer,
their compositions defined by the score. Prior
to this divide, one could say, all musicians were
performers of their own work, and perhaps that
of others—troubadours might have played each
other’s songs. Scholars of medieval church music
debate whether there existed even a limited canon
of noncontemporary works—the “work concept”
evolved only with the notion of composer as desk
worker. (In literature, the work concept appeared
much earlier.)5
The desk worker model assumes a concept
of the musical work, therefore—“work” mean-
ing “artwork.” “Art” here has a capital “A”—
autonomous art in a public arena, normally with a
unique, named creator, arising with amodern sys-
tem of the arts, involving an overarching concept
of art, or of artworks (see Hamilton 2007a, chap.
1). In the pre-RenaissanceWest, and non-Western
cultures, in contrast, art is nonautonomous—
subsidiary to nonartistic activities, religious, mil-
itary, or social. Paintings, sculptures, and musical
pieces that are now regarded as artworks were not
so regarded.6
According to the familiar story, the work
concept expressed Western music’s increasing
portability—not the much later Sony Walkman
revolution, but the repeatability of compositions
in different locations and times, by different per-
formers, and in that sense standardized. When
Bach was Kapellmeister at Ko¨then, he wrote for
a particular location and set of performers, with-
out thought for portability; performers were ex-
pected to embellish and elaborate. Bach’s compo-
sitions have become works. A work, strictly un-
derstood, may be inspired by or commissioned
for a particular occasion, or particular perform-
ers, but is not limited in performance by this.
There are obvious parallels with developments
in other arts, related to art’s growing autonomy,
and commodification—notably the portability of
framed paintings.7
As the familiar story stresses, with the de-
velopment of the work concept came a decline
in what is usually called improvisation. Bach,
Mozart, and Beethoven were great improvisers;
in early nineteenth-century Europe, professional
keyboard players and composers—and many
amateurs—were trained to improvise. As com-
posers’ authority grew after the mid-nineteenth
century, a Romantic ideal of improvisation sup-
planted improvisation in public performance—
composers still improvised in private, but
“improvisation” acquired pejorative connotations
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of lack of discipline or planning (seeGooley 2018).
Berliozwas one of the firstWestern composers not
to be an instrumental performer, though he con-
ducted. As composers wrote more elaborately, or-
chestrating for a larger range of colors and sounds,
scores became increasingly prescriptive, limiting
performer input—though any system of notation
requires interpretation. That at least is the familiar
story. Classical musicians, up to the present, con-
tinued to improvise in the organ loft, in schools,
and for dancers—activities underrecognized and
underappreciated.
II.B. Improvisation and Composition in Their
Broader Senses
To reiterate, I do not reject the familiar story,
but wish to qualify it, placing it in a broader
context. In particular, there is a question how
one should describe the situation before the
composer–performer divide. In the third through
fifth editions of Grove’s Dictionary of Music and
Musicians, Henry Colles describes improvisation
as “the primitive act of music-making” ([1927]
1954, vol. II, 991)—contrast the complete reversal
of this view found in the most recent edition (be-
low). Roger Scruton refers more neutrally to “the
emergence of ‘works’ from a tradition of sponta-
neous performance” (1997, 111)—what Jim Sam-
son calls the “ancient art of improvisation” (2008,
46). But the immense diversity of musical tra-
ditions puts such claims in question, as Laudan
Nooshin’s critique of the traditional opposition of
improvisation and composition shows.
Nooshin would not, I think, deny something
like the familiar modernist story of Western mu-
sic, but disputes the terms in which it is usually
expressed. Improvisation, she argues, is “a term
which . . . emerged in the context of European art
music [as a] consequence of the development of
notation (and thus the conceptual division be-
tween performer and composer)” (2003, 248). But
by the late nineteenth century, it had “become a
marker to distinguish between the creative pro-
cesses in [Western art] music (which had notation
and was therefore art) and other musics (which
generally did not and therefore were not)” (248).
Thus, for one latter-day imperialist,
Indianmusic is almost entirely amatter of improvisation.
Art . . . never can be [improvised] . . . Indian music has
yet to suffer the pangs of [artistic] birth [and]must boldly
proclaim itself on paper, in black and white. (Nichols
1944, 134–136)8
Leo Treitler comments that musics outside the
Western notated tradition were often regarded as
improvised, in the negative sense of something un-
prepared and unforeseen, “the exception to some-
thing . . . more grounded” (1991, 66). Nooshin
summarizes this negative view of improvisation as
“absence of notation equals non-cerebral, which
. . . equals non-art” (2003, 246).
In recent decades, that negative view has been
transformed into something more positive, but
more subtly Eurocentric. As Nooshin comments
improvisation had served partly as an arena to play out
Western representations of the primitive and untutored
“other”; now this orientalist tropewas turned on its head
and improvisation came instead to represent . . . [what]
was perhaps being lost in modern Western societies.
(2003, 250)9
However, she continues, “Despite a growing ap-
preciation of improvisation as a kind of composi-
tion, the dualistic discourses have remained with
us” (254), as we fail to recognize the lengthy train-
ing of many improvised traditions (251). Bruno
Nettl challenged the idea of improvisation and
composition as opposites (1974), but onemust still
insist that improvisational and compositional ele-
ments are found in all music (Nooshin 2003, 256).
Nooshin is right—what writers failed to grasp
is that improvisation is a kind of composition. But
a residue of the traditional view, that composition
in the narrow sense is the highest kind of musical
creation, perhaps remains in her account. A fur-
ther step is needed—one must distinguish specific
and more general senses of composition and im-
provisation, a distinction implicit in the language
game involving music and the performing arts.10
To reiterate, there are two senses of composition:
1. In music and performing arts: composition
is opposed to narrow-sense improvisation—
composers are mostly desk workers who pro-
duce works, usually notated.
2. More generally: composition involves putting
things together, in an aesthetically pleas-
ing form, which improvisers as well as desk
composers do—essential to any artistic activ-
ity or performance.
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For free improviser Keith Rowe, “There is no
such thing as non-composedmusic. You can never
get away from some formof composition” (quoted
in Olewnick 2017, 134). Philip Alperson argues
that “A musical performance . . . always involves
formative decisions about how a piece shall sound,
i.e., decisions about [its] form or composition”
(1984, 20). They are referring to composition in
the broad sense.
The distinction between broad and narrow
senses explains why some improvisers refer to im-
provisation as a compositional method—funding
bodies contrast their work with that of paper com-
posers who produce scores. As Tony Buck com-
ments, “it’s no longer a dichotomy of improvising
and composing . . . improvisation is a methodol-
ogy for composing, just like serialism, or rhythmic
inter-locking” (quoted in Hamilton, forthcoming
2020).
Improvisation as a compositional method in-
volves:
1. Spontaneous composition
2. No repeat performance of the composition—
rejection of the work concept, of a fixed and
repeatable composition.
These features are separable. Scelsi’s improvi-
sations were transcribed by Tosatti and others,
and published as Scelsi compositions. (Tosatti’s
role has been much debated.) This is “improvi-
sation as a compositional method,” but not in
the free improviser’s sense. Scelsi intended his
improvisations to be transcribed and published
as compositions; in other cases, improvisations
have been performed as if they were composi-
tions, without the improviser intending this. Thus,
Jean-Yves Thibaudet performs Bill Evans impro-
visations, andGeorgeRussell based a composition
on Miles Davis’s solo on “So What.”
Improvisation also has specific and more gen-
eral senses:
1. In music and performing arts, improvisation
is opposed to composition—it is an approach
to performance that does not involve prior
deskwork or non-notated composition.
2. More generally: improvisation is opposed to
“using an established method.”
The second sense involves an aesthetics of
imperfection: “We did not have the proper
tools/ingredients/instruments, so we improvised.”
Thus “I did not have a chisel, so I improvised using
a screwdriver,” or “I did not have the right mate-
rials to fix the car, so I improvised withWD40 and
Blu Tack.” The second sense also yields a deeper
response to the music-specific question. Much im-
provisation does use an established method. For
instance, Mozart’s improvised cadenzas adhered
to the idiom of his notated works; jazz improvisers
often use a stock of idiomatic gestures or “licks.”11
Lydia Goehr distinguishes between improvisa-
tion extempore, “when musicians make up music
in performance,” and the “less familiar concept
[of] improvisation impromptu . . . what we do . . .
in the moment [when] confronted with an unex-
pected difficulty” (2016, 460). Goehr notes that
improvisation extempore has been used to critique
the classical work concept, which she wishes to
reenergize (459). There are interesting parallels
here with the theme of the present article—and
its precursor—that works can accommodate an
aesthetics of imperfection, which is an aesthetics
of performance in general. The sense of improvi-
sation as “making do” underlies my formulation
of aesthetics of imperfection as positive response
to contingencies. But that is an issue for another
occasion.
I now showhow these distinctions between con-
cepts of composition and improvisation elucidate
their reciprocity.
iii. the reciprocity of improvisation and
composition
Distinguishing broad and narrow senses of
composition shows how improvisation and com-
position may not be opposites, but can stand in
a reciprocal relation. My precursor article argued
that composition and improvisation are interpen-
etrating opposites—we now see that broad sense
composition has a two-way interdependence with
improvisation. As Rohan de Saram comments,
“The improvised piece [aspires to] the solidity
of a written piece, the written piece [aspires] to
loosen itself up like an improvisation, to give itself
spontaneity” (forthcoming 2020). That is, (1) im-
provisations aspire to be compositions (narrow
sense); and (2) interpretation of compositions
aspires to improvisatory spontaneity, making the
composition appear as spontaneously created as
an improvisation. (The perfectionist improviser
ill-advisedly tries to achieve (1) by rehearsing
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their “improvisation,” so that it comes out right
on the night.)
Thus, it is wrong to say, as many commenta-
tors do, that the work concept expresses the aes-
thetics of perfection. Works can accommodate an
aesthetics of imperfection—which is an aesthet-
ics of performance in general, not just of impro-
vised performance. The fact that both imperfec-
tionists and perfectionists fail to recognize this
suggests the residual influence of the “mechan-
ical reproduction” picture of interpretation—a
picture that imperfectionists condemn and per-
fectionists apparently endorse. Thus, as we saw,
for the perfectionist Schoenberg, the creative in-
terpreter “becomes a parasite on the exterior,
when he could be the artery in the circulation
of the blood” (Stuckenschmidt 1977, 227). Video
artist/composer Christian Marclay, an imperfec-
tionist, comments half-ironically, “I get [musi-
cians] involved in the process. I’m not one of
those fascist composers who says, ‘Play this!’”
(Bradshaw 2018). As Rachel Stroud notes, “Per-
formance of notated works is still often seen as
diametrically opposed to the spontaneous, col-
laborative creativity of improvisation . . . classical
performers [are] somehow uncreative, destined to
replicate stagnant ‘works’” (Stroud, forthcoming
2020). I stress that this view is implausible and do
not in any way defend it—but it seems implicit
in common views of interpretation, even though
proponents of the latter might deny it.
To regard classical performers as somehow un-
creative is to fail to recognize the artistry of inter-
pretation; as Adorno suggested, interpretation of
the greatest works is inexhaustible (see Paddison
2016). Creative interpreters strive for improvisa-
tional freshness—the illusion that a work is being
created spontaneously. It is true that among clas-
sical performers, Horowitz’s statement is unusual:
“a work should never be played the same way . . .
I may play the same program from one recital to
the next, but Iwill play it differently . . . it is always
new” (quoted in Mach 1991, 119). But metaphors
of “bringing to life” or “making it sound fresh”
are common. In contrast are classical perform-
ers who “perform their CD” live, reiterating their
recorded interpretation. Like jazz performerswho
rehearse solos, these may be enjoyable phenom-
ena of the entertainment industry, but are artis-
tically limited (see Cant, forthcoming 2020). The
requirement of spontaneity helps establish impro-
visation, in its narrow, modern sense, as an art.
Philosophers, Alperson apart, have tended to
neglect reciprocity, holding with Gioia that nega-
tive features of jazz improvisation are compen-
sated by excitement and spontaneity. Thus, for
Francis Sparshott, in improvisation “we make al-
lowances for fluffs, interruptions, squawks” (1982,
255). The result, as we see in the final section, is
an aesthetics of imperfection without a positive
notion of imperfection. Musicologists, in contrast,
recognize reciprocity, without linking it explicitly
to an aesthetics of imperfection. Thus, Nicholas
Cook (2013) sees improvisation and work per-
formance as interpenetrating practices—in more
open Baroque scores, and in Haydn, Mozart, or
Beethoven. Playing a Mozart quartet, comments
Bruce Johnson, is an act of collective improvisa-
tional performance—intonation and rhythm are
nuanced and accommodated within the ensem-
ble (2002, 104)—while forRichardCochrane, “the
practice of improvisation . . . exists in all musical
performances” (2000, 140). In New Grove Dic-
tionary of Music and Musicians, Stephen Blum
almost dispenses with improvisation as an activ-
ity separate from composition, describing both in-
terpreting a score, and what is generally referred
to as improvisation, as “composition during per-
formance” (2001, 192–193). What these writers
are suggesting is that imperfection in the ordi-
nary, negative sense, and in my distinctive positive
sense, applies as much to performance of a score,
as to improvisation.
It may seem improbable that interpretation is
not recognized as an art—but how else to explain
the widespread view that improvisation is riskier
and more error strewn, and so more amenable
to an aesthetics of imperfection? This is the topic
of the next section, which extends the claim that
improvisation and composition interpenetrate, by
looking at their allegedly contrasting attitudes to
risk, and mistakes. We will see that responses to
mistakes are part of a broader, positive aesthetics
of imperfection, and not simply a negative feature
of improvisation to be tolerated.
iv. risk, error, and mistake
This section critiques Gioia’s view that it is some-
how distinctive of improvised music that “Errors
will creep in . . . in form [and] execution.” We now
see that risk is present in all performance, but that
improvisation and composition approach it from
different angles. This section provides further
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evidence that improvisation is not simply opposed
to composition. They have structural features in
common, arising from the logical grammar of mis-
take, elucidated by J. L. Austin and Wittgenstein.
IV.A. “Improvisation Is Risky”
The common view—that improvisation is
riskier—neglects the interpreter’s genuine, if
secondary, artistry. Thus, for Alperson, “im-
provisation [adds] to the conventional musical
performance situation a greater element of risk”
(1984, 23). Victor Dura`-Vila`, comments that
“improvisers have less control over their material
[which] makes improvisation riskier [than] where
the material can be abundantly scrutinized and
assessed by the creative artist” (forthcoming
2020). On this view, “The improviser is in the
most precarious position . . . creating a musical
work anew as it is being performed” (forthcoming
2020). Performing a composition is less risky, it is
assumed, because the composer in their study has
done the artistic work—the interpreter can fail as
craftsperson, but the improviser can fail as both
craftsperson and artist.
To reiterate, this view fails to recognize the
interpreter’s artistry. Both improvisers and inter-
preters may produce unstructured, rambling per-
formances. To say that a work is successful is to say
that a serious attempt at performance is worth-
while. As conductor Colin Davis retorted, when
a colleague criticized a performance of The Mar-
riage of Figaro, “Yes, but what awork,man, what a
work!” (quoted in Hamilton 1993, 186). The work
concept can “accommodate” poor performances;
one “hears” the composition through them.12 It
might be argued that if one can hear the work
through the poor performance, that performance
is less risky than a poor improvisation where one
hears nothing—but the argument is becoming ab-
struse.
It is true that imperfectionist improvisation
encourages risk, because genuine spontaneity,
whether in improvisation or interpretation, is
risky. Derek Bailey favored the riskier approach
of presenting improvisers who have never collab-
orated: “The best moments that I’ve found in im-
provisation often happen fairly early in a relation-
ship . . . Later other kinds of things develop and
the assumption is that this is an improvement. I’m
not so sure” (1996). In another sense, however, im-
perfectionist improvisation is less risky. As Tony
Buck commented, “If [the room] has weird quirks,
and [the interpreter is] obliged to do a certain
[composition], and it’s not going to work, [they]
still have to do it”—an outcome that improvisers
avoid.
IV.B. “There Are No Mistakes in (Free)
Improvisation”
Concerning mistakes, the improvisation–
interpretation asymmetry is also often exag-
gerated. Recall that mistakes are among the
contingencies to which imperfectionists respond
positively. The philosophical literature onmistake
and error distinguishesmistakes from other errors
only in that they require background under-
standing or capacity, and so are in some sense
blameworthy; other errors involve epistemic bad
luck. Austin’s “A Plea for Excuses” suggests a
threefold distinction: accidents, mistakes, and
errors that are not mistakes. Austin focuses on
the contrast between mistakes and accidents, but
comments that “In an accident something befalls:
by mistake you take the wrong one: in error you
stray” (1961, 28). Thus, one could say
1. The pianist hits the wrong key by mistake, in-
tending to hit another; they had not practiced
sufficiently, or their technique was inadequate.
2. They hit the key deliberately but in error—the
score was incorrect, or they misread or forgot
the passage. Perhaps the otherwise excellent
Urtext edition contained an inaccuracy—but it
was not a cheap, poorly produced score that the
pianist could be blamed for using. (“He chose
the wrong edition.”)
3. They hit the wrong key by accident, as the pi-
ano stool shifted—as Austin argued, whether
it is an accident, or a mistake depends on how
hitting the wrong note came about.
A slip or typo is often an accident, but it is
a mistake if it resulted from typing too fast, or
reading the transcribed text carelessly.13 One is
responsible for a mistake, but not for an accident.
“You were not looking where you were going!”
suggests that it was not an accident, as does “You
should have taken a typing course.”
Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty elucidates the con-
cept of “mistake,” although it does not address the
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contrast between error and mistake that Austin
discusses only briefly. A mistake occurs when
someone can reason or observe correctly, but is
inattentive or careless, or reasons wrongly: “Can’t
we say: amistake doesn’t only have a cause, it also
has a ground? I.e., roughly: when someone makes
a mistake, this can be fitted into what he knows
aright” (1969, paragraph 74). That is, to describe
something as a mistake is to say that it is to some
extent understandable, because it emerges expli-
cably from the subject’s beliefs or capacities.14
Being mistaken is like misremembering or
misunderstanding—which involve remembering
or understanding, and so are not cases simply
of not remembering or understanding. Being
mistaken—in contrast to making an error—
involves getting things partly right: the archaeolo-
gist recognizedabodypartwith fivedigits, butmis-
takenly concluded that it was a hand, not a foot.
Similarly, misunderstanding someone’s words
involves only a partial failure of communication;
if I cannot recognize their language, the result
is not misunderstanding, but complete failure to
understand.AsAustin writes, I shoot your donkey
by mistake because I know what a donkey looks
like, can recognize yours and mine—but in this
case confuse them (1961, 133). Playing or singing
out of tune might be a mistake, slip, or accident,
but not when perpetually tuneless soprano Flo-
rence Foster Jenkins does it—or jazz saxophonist
Jackie McLean, whose acidulous style involved
playing sharp, perhaps to stand out from the
ensemble.
As Wittgenstein suggests, when someone
makes a mistake, one can describe the faulty rea-
soning, or inattentive observation, that took them
from knowledge to error. What may be termed
an individualist conception maintains that a mis-
take is something that infringes one’s own stan-
dards. But that is incorrect—mistakes and errors
are relative to correct standards. (We will shortly
see the individualist conception’s limited truth.)
The vocal stand-in on the biopic Florence Foster
Jenkins may sometimes have made the “mistake”
of singing in tune.When they sing a phrase in tune,
this is a mistake by the standard, imitate Jenkins,
but not by the standard, sing the tune correctly.
In the context of making the movie, the standard
imitate Jenkins is the correct one—whether some-
thing counts as a mistake depends on the crite-
rion of success. The common paradoxical notion
of a deliberate mistake helps here.
We now apply this discussion to performances
involving composition and improvisation. In per-
forming score-based music, there can be wrong
notes, and mistaken—perhaps inauthentic—
tempos. In jazz, players misread or mishear chord
progressions; Coltrane once forgot to repeat a
song’s first eight bars.15 Art Tatum commented,
“There’s no such thing as a wrong note. It all de-
pendsonhowyou resolve it” (quoted inBertinetto
2016, 88). Thus, if a jazz player mistakenly plays
the “wrong” scale over the chords, and adjusts
rapidly, it is no longer an error—as Charlie Parker
said, “You’re never more than a half-step [semi-
tone] from a right note.” (The quote has various
versions—apparently,manyParker “quotes”were
fabricated by journalists.) Thus, T. Carl Whitmer:
The idea . . . must always be kept in a state of flux.
An error may only be an unintentioned rightness . . .
Polishing is not at all the important thing; instead strive
for a rough go-ahead energy. Do not be afraid of being
wrong; just be afraid of being uninteresting. (1934, 16)
A novice stops after a mistake, a perfection-
ist conceals it—and an imperfectionist exploits or
develops it. As TheloniousMonk complained, fol-
lowing a performance he found unsatisfying: “I
made the wrong mistakes” (Feurzeig 2011, 30).
In post-bebop jazz, Parker’s “half-step rule”
was reformulated. The notion of “correctness”
over a chord progressionwas expanded, and tones
outside the chord’s theoretical function tolerated
or encouraged. Post-bebop techniques include
“sidestepping” or “sideslipping”—playing amode
or scale a semitone from the stated one, then slid-
ing back—or the less systematic use of outside
notes, as in Paul Bley’s remarkable solo on “All
the Things You Are.”16
Free jazzers of the 1960s might acknowledge
wrong notes, though without defining them har-
monically. Both free jazz and free improvisation—
useful but contestable labels—aim to maximize
freedom, avoiding explicit grooves and chord
changes. Steve Lacy recalled: “In ‘60 [trumpeter
Don Cherry] was completely free already. . . . He
used to tell me, ‘Come on, let’s play’. I’d say
. . . ‘What tune?’, and he’d say, ‘Come on let’s
just play’. And that was new to me” (1974).17 In
fact, free jazz often has a compositional struc-
ture; as Adam Fairhall (email communication,
2018) comments, most of its 1960s albums have a
recognizable precomposition element. In contrast,
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free improvisation—a mostly European develop-
ment from free jazz—aimed at totally sponta-
neous improvisation, generally avoiding even a
residual pulse.
As Marcello Ruta comments, “Free improvisa-
tion can (and possibly necessarily does) use exist-
ing musical material. But such . . . material is not
programmatically chosen in advance by the per-
former, who therefore is not committed to it”
(2017, 513). For some commentators, it follows
thatmistakes in free improvisation are impossible.
After an improvisation by cellist Rohan de Saram,
his colleague from the Arditti Quartet joked, “I
didn’t spot a single wrong note!” Pianist John Sni-
jders comments:
It is hard to know what meaning “mistake” has [here].
In a composed piece, a mistake means doing something
one is not supposed to do. In free improvisation, it seems
only to mean doing something one has not planned to
do. (De Saram, forthcoming 2020; Snijders personal cor-
respondence, 2018)
One could add: “or doing something one there-
after regrets having done.” Composer/improviser
Cornelius Cardew developed this thought in a sur-
prising direction: “The only criterion for a sound
is: ‘was the player expecting (intending) to make
it?’ If not, it was a mistake, and makes a differ-
ent sort of claim to beauty . . . mistakes are the
only truly spontaneous actions we are capable
of” (quoted inTilbury, forthcoming 2020). Cardew
was probably reflecting JohnCage’s comment that
“A ‘mistake’ is beside the point, for once anything
happens it authentically is” (Cage 1952, 59).
The free improviser may have no long-term
plan, procedure, or set course; but they may do
things that they did not intend, which perhaps
amount to mistakes. It might be argued that “mis-
take” implies an established procedure—so in
free improvisation, these cannot occur. However,
projects like the Portsmouth Sinfonia aside—
performers played unfamiliar instruments, as well
as they could—free improvisation calls for tech-
nical skills, even if these are unconventional. As
free improviser Steve Beresford comments:18
Adam Bohman, who rarely plays a conventional instru-
ment, has to devise his own techniques . . . bowing bits of
cardboard and rubbing light bulbs against record racks—
there is virtuosity there, but it’s to do with an instrument
that you can’t be trained on, because you just invented
it. (Hamilton, forthcoming 2021)
Doing something by accident is not a way of go-
ingwrong.But there is a further category of “going
wrong”—poor choices. Thus, there are three ways
of going wrong in pursuit of truth, or in artistic or
other practice:
1. mistake or avoidable ignorance, where check-
ing procedures are known and available;
2. error or unavoidable ignorance, concerning
novel phenomena without a familiar, agreed
procedure;
3. poor choices—including aesthetically poor
choices—that do not amount to mistake or er-
ror.
IV.C. Mistakes, Errors, Poor Artistic Choices,
and Misconceptions
Those who discern mistakes in free improvisation
may in fact be referring to poor artistic choices.
There is a continuum between mistakes and er-
rors on the one hand, and poor artistic choices
andmisconceptions on the other. BrianOlewnick,
biographer of free improviser Keith Rowe, re-
ports: “Rowe certainly thinks that not only can
mistakes be made—they usually are. At an im-
provised concert, he will grimace from time to
time [at] wrong choices” (personal correspon-
dence, 2018). Free improvisers, like anyone en-
gaged in a skilled activity with artistic standards,
can make poor choices—though these are not, as
Rowe perhaps thinks, mistakes. The existence of
aesthetic aims implies the possibility of misunder-
standing, expressed through poor artistic choices.
Lloyd Swanton of The Necks explains the trio’s
artistic aims, in a way that suggests that free im-
provisation has no rules:
We’re not pure free improvisers because we have a
couple of rules or customs. The first is “one person
starts.” The second is that we’ll not hurry the progress
of the piece—we’re not going to change until someone’s
got an idea. That was a big revelation for us. (Hamilton,
in preparation)
The trio perhaps has other rules—“No one ‘so-
los’,” “Keep things minimal”—which distinguish
their music from its origins in post-Coltrane jazz.
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For a player to “solo” in jazz fashionwould contra-
vene the group’s artistic premise. However, Philip
Clark, participant in Eddie Prevost’s free improvi-
sation workshops, contrasts “momentary lapses of
technique” with “systematic misunderstanding”:
Some people come for months without real understand-
ing of its purpose—the search for new sounds overriding
the necessity to “perform” . . . They heard what they
wanted to play and executed it well technically. But
their blinkered idea . . . never shifted—they [continued]
to play Weather Report riffs or Keith Jarrett-like Ro-
manticism. (personal correspondence, January 2019)
“Systematic misunderstanding” involves con-
travention of artistic premises amounting to con-
ceptual error.
After modernism, classicism with its rules of
taste became untenable. But we still talk of aes-
thetic failings—an off-white jacket and cream
trousers do not match, blue and gray go better
than blue and green—while remaining alive to
style that transcends such errors. When someone
puts on a pullover other than the one they in-
tended, they might have made what most people
think is the most felicitous choice—an uninten-
tioned rightness—by mistake. Whether it is a mis-
take depends on whether I am the kind of person
who cares about dressing fashionably—this seems
to be the truth in the individualist conception re-
jected earlier. If I do not care—or simply cannot
afford to—then it is not a mistake. There are er-
rors, slips, poor choices, andmisconceptions in im-
provised music, therefore—aesthetic rather than
cognitive. But Gioia is mistaken in assuming that
any of these is likelier in improvisation than other
kinds of music making.
v. the aesthetics of imperfection
We will now see that understanding the imper-
fectionist’s view of mistakes helps us understand
the aesthetic’s positive value. Many readers hold
that “imperfection” cannot be positive. But one
should first note that “imperfection” is not the
opposite of “perfection.” It is like misremember-
ing or misunderstanding—which, to reiterate, in-
volve remembering or understanding, and so are
not cases simply of not remembering or under-
standing. Imperfection presupposes background
order, functionality, or even perfection, not the
pursuit of disorder or anarchy. But the key defense
of aesthetic imperfection is that there is something
wrong with the thoroughgoing pursuit of perfec-
tion. Jazz pianist Frank Kimbrough contrasts his
own approach with the perfectionist entertainer
who pleases the public: “It’s not about perfection.
It’s not about a show. I don’t plan sets, ever. I’m
playing solo tomorrow, and I have no idea what
I’m going to play” (2016).
Still the objection persists, “Why character-
ize spontaneity, creativity, and vibrancy as im-
perfection? Kimbrough said, ‘It’s not about
perfection’—he did not add, ‘It’s about imperfec-
tion’.” That is, “perfection is not the aim” does
not imply, “Imperfection is.” But it can be an
aim. The Japanese wabi-sabi aesthetic prizes, and
does not just tolerate, imperfection. To reiterate, it
involves object-specific appreciation, acceptance,
ageing—a mark on a bowl enhances its value. For
Otomo Yoshihide, “If I find something perfect,
that’s wrong. Nothing perfect in life” (quoted in
Tilbury, forthcoming 2020).
The value of imperfection, in this sense, is a
human value—“nothing perfect in [human] life.”
For composer Linda Catlin Smith, imperfection
involves a “by-hand” quality:
wabi-sabi accepts transience and impermanence . . . the
object is made by hand, and therefore has the tiny de-
viations or imperfections left by that touch . . . the sense
of the lip on the mouthpiece, the hair of the bow on the
string, the contact of the mallet or stick or bow. (forth-
coming 2020)
She describes a composition’s “subtle varia-
tions akin to the imperfections in a hand-drawn
picture [and] in the way things change as they
age—the paint on the canvas cracks, fabric fades”:
A finished composition [is] fixed on the page. But the
resulting performancewill always have the by-hand-ness
quality . . . If I wanted absolute control over the sounding
experience I would make an electroacoustic recorded
work.
It should be stressed that before the digital age,
all artifacts had this “by-hand” quality. A visit to
a railway museum shows that the coachwork and
cab instruments on steam and early diesel locomo-
tives were made by hand, using plates and rivets.
The finish is crude comparedwith currentmolding
andComputer Numerical Control manufacturing;
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individual locomotives of the same pattern or type
have noticeable differences in their details.
David Lloyd offers a powerful objection to aes-
thetic imperfection, when he distinguishes (1) tol-
erance of imperfection, (2) artistic exploitation of
imperfection, and (3) imperfection as an aim. He
argues that imperfectionism is unstable. Exploita-
tion, he argues, supports an aesthetics of imperfec-
tion only in a weak, parasitic sense: “A genuinely
independent aesthetics of imperfection requires
the identification of imperfections that bear aes-
thetic value in their own right.” Guitar feedback
was an unwelcome technical disturbance, that be-
came a signature of improvised rock. What was
originally, and in most genres still is, regarded as
a flaw or imperfection in the sound has become a
virtue or perfection. If improvisational art forms
are being inappropriately evaluated as composi-
tional forms, Lloyd argues, then instead of seek-
ing an unstable aesthetics of imperfection, one
should “fully recognize improvisation’s distinctive
features as virtues fit for aesthetic appreciation
in [their own] terms” (all quotations from Lloyd,
forthcoming, 2020).
Lloyd is right to argue that what was imper-
fect can become a new style or aesthetic—another
kind of perfection. The conversion of errors into
felicities is a familiar artistic process. Like gui-
tar feedback, vinyl applique´ effects in glitch elec-
tronica began as straightforward imperfections—
surface noise or tape hiss. Antares Auto-Tune was
originally a device to correct a singer’s errors in
pitch, but after Cher’s 1998 hit “Believe,” produc-
ers used it as a sound effect, deliberately distorting
vocals—creating some of the crassest subgenres
in the history of commodification. A mark on a
Japanese bowl becomes a felicity, just as for Char-
lie Parker, a mistake is converted into a rightness.
One might argue that the elderly Lee Konitz is
not the player he used to be, but in his hesitations
and imperfections, we recognize our frailty and
humanity. More positively, we may discern a late
style, like late-period Lester Young or Bud Pow-
ell. It is a narrow aestheticism that rejects such
considerations in artistic evaluation.
I would argue that imperfectionism is not unsta-
ble, however. A process can become predictable.
DerekBailey’s broken guitar string, or TheNecks’
silent waiting at the start of a performance, be-
gan as contingencies, but became expected. But
the true imperfectionist always seeks new con-
tingencies, constantly striving for spontaneity—as,
indeed, may a true artist. My opening definition
of imperfectionism was an open, spontaneous re-
sponse to the contingencies of the performing sit-
uation. In response to Lloyd’s objections, this def-
inition should be developed: imperfectionism is a
constant striving for new contingencies to respond
to. Perfectionism, in contrast, is a mode of enter-
tainment or a mode of classicism. But to pursue
this issue takes us into questions of art and enter-
tainment, and classicism and Romanticism, that
are material for another occasion.19
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